Tulsa Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 3

1970

The Failing Company Doctrine
Dennis R. McDaniel

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dennis R. McDaniel, The Failing Company Doctrine, 6 Tulsa L. J. 263 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss3/6

This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

McDaniel: The Failing Company Doctrine

19701

OIL DISCHARGE DAMAGES

In conclusion, this decision, if allowed to stand, appears
to open to the states an important new method for enforcing their antipollution laws and for preserving and protecting their navigable waters from the discharge and dumping
of oil. While the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act 29 will continue to provide a forum in admiralty
for oil spill damage cases consummated on land, it is important
that there be a remedy to help prevent the far costlier damage
to the water itself, and to marine life. The federal district
court in Bournemouth has provided such a remedy.
Kenneth P. Snoke
2 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).

ANTITRUST LAW - THE FAILING COMPANY
DOCTRINE
In 1940 the companies publishing The Tucson Daily Citizen
and The Arizona Daily Star entered into a joint operating
agreement for the purpose of ending all commercial and business competition between the two papers. Prior to that time,
the Star Publishing Company had averaged annual profits
of about $25,825, while the Citizen Publishing Company's annual losses averaged about $23,500. It was hoped that the
agreement would foster the economic growth and development of both papers. By 1964, prosperity had been achieved.
The trial court found that the joint venture's profits had
reached $1,727,217.' The method employed to obtain this economic stability was a three-fold operation. While each newspaper maintained its own corporate identity and editorial
independence, joint control was exercised with respect to
each company's printing, advertising and circulation. This
1

United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978,
982 (D. Ariz. 1968), affd, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
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three-fold operation was later re-defined by the Supreme
Court as: price fixing 2-the subscription and advertising rates
were set jointly; profit pooling'-all profits realized were
pooled and distributed according to an agreed ratio; and market
control 4-it was agreed that neither officers nor stockholders
of either company would engage in any other publishing
business in the county. The agreement was therefore condemned as an agreement in restraint of trade-a violation
of Section One of the Sherman Act. 5 The Court emphatically
stated that it did not object to all forms of joint operating
agreements but only to such agreements which applied anticompetitive measures to obtain a desired end. 6
The case was also tried as a violation of Section Seven
of the Clayton Act,T arising out of Citizen's acquisition of
Star stock pursuant to an option in the joint-operating agreement. Section Seven of the Clayton Act prohibits an acquisition of assets or stock where there is a reasonable probability
that the effect of the acquisition will be to substantially lessen
competition in any line of commerce, in any section of the
country.8 Appellants offered in their defense the failing company doctrine. 9 They asserted that Citizen was in fact a
Price fixing has been declared illegal per se. See United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942).
3 A violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1 (1964). See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 328 (1904).
4 Also, a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1964). See Tinken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) ("Every contract [or] combination [,]
2

...

in restraint of trade or commerce among the several

States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
").
6 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135-36
(1969) (The Court stated that the Section 1 violations were
"plain beyond peradventure" of doubt.).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
8

Id.

9 See Generally Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The
"Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEo. L.J. 84 (1960).
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failing company in 1940 and that the effect of the acquisition
of such a company did not have the probable effect of substantially lessening competition. However, the Court ruled
that appellants had not sustained their burden of proof in
showing that they were, in actuality, a failing company.
Prior decisions have asserted that a company claiming
such a defense must prove that its resources are so depleted
and its prospects for rehabilitation so remote that the firm
faces a clear probability of business failure.1 0 Mere proof
that business has been unprofitable for a period of time, or
that it has suffered under poor management will not suffice."
At the time of the joint operating agreement, Citizen's
liabilities exceeded its assets by some $53,000, and it had $420
in bank deposits and $66.28 in cash on hand. Yet, the Supreme Court found that Citizen was not a failing company.
It was, the Court argued, an effective competitor and a significant threat to the Star. Citizen had a circulation equal
to the Star's; and, of equal significance, it had failed to act
as would a firm on the brink of business disaster. No effort
had been made to sell the Citizen, and its owners were not
contemplating liquidation.12 Nor was the joint operating
agreement "the last straw at which the Citizen grasped."''
Even assuming, the Court states, that the Citizen was a failing company, it had not made any substantial affirmative
effort to sell to an outsider-a requisite for a company claiming a failing company exemption. 14
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
"1 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div. MERGER GUIDENS,TRADE REG. REP. (No. 363, June 3, 1968).
12 394 U.S. at 137-38.
1 394 U.S. at 137 (Douglas, J., majority opinion).
14 Id. at 138. Prior decisions have established that a failing
company could not be sold to a competitor if there was another "prospective purchaser" in the market. International
Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930); cf. United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). However, until the
Citizen PublishingCompany opinion was rendered, a failing
10
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Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion attacked
the Court's new affirmative effort guideline as unreasonable.
He asserted that a company should not be required to forfeit
its failing company defense merely because it had not made
a substantial affirmative effort to sell to a noncompetitor.
Also he noted that testimony was introduced which showed
that, in the prevailing business climate, the Citizen could not
possibly have been sold to an outsider.
Nevertheless, the basis for the Court's decision is a rational one. The purpose of the antitrust laws is to preserve
the competitive process and to prevent the rising tide of
economic concentration. And the failing company doctrine
arose from the theory that the merger of the weak can do
no harm to the competitive process. However, this exemption is dependent upon the company seeking its protection
truly being a failing company. Therefore, If the doctrine is to
be invoked, it would not seem harsh that such a company be
required to prove that its prospects for reorganization were
"dim or non-existent."'r5 Otherwise, it would be fairly easy for
a relatively healthy firm to assume the appearance of a failing
company for the purpose of avoiding an antitrust suit. Likewise, it is not unreasonable to require a company seeking
protection of the doctrine to make a substantial and affirmative effort to sell to a non-competitor before it claims exemption as a failing company.
There appears to this writer a certain fallacy in the
theory that the sale of the weak can not have the probable
company was never expressly required to make an effort to
find such a prospective purchaser.
15 394 U.S. at 138 (Mr. Justice Douglas noted that companies
have reorganized through receivership or through the Bankruptcy Act and emerged as strong competitive companies.
The Citizen made no effort of any kind to reorganize. The
Court stated that for the failing company doctrine to apply
the prospects for reorganization of the Citizen would have
had to be "dim or nonexistent.").
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effect of substantially lessening competition. This would appear to be especially true in the instance of newspaper mergers.16 With the advent of the joint agreement between the
Citizen and the Star, only one newspaper operation remained
in Tucson. Thus, even the merger of a failing company may
contribute to the rising tide of economic concentration and
foreclose a substantial market which was available to the
acquiring corporation's competitors or potential competitors.
If a failing company is required to make an affirmative
effort to sell to a noncompetitor, there is a chance, as Mr.
Justice Douglas states, that another p u r c h a s e r could be
found; and thus, the competitive process could be preserved
and not sacrificed to a monopoly power. 17 Such a requirement is more in line with the purpose of antitrust policy.
The failing company exemption should not be employed by
healthy firms as a device to reap merger profits and escape
antitrust violations. In light of the Citizen Publishing Company case, the failing company exemption has been more
definitely narrowed; it need now only be enforced.
Dennis R. McDaniel
10

Economic concentration is very high in the newspaper
industry. It has been reported that competition in newspapers survives in only about fifty cities today. See Roberts,
Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82 I-Ahv. L.
REV. 319, 320 (1968).

17 394 U.S. at 138.
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